412 F.Supp. 732
In re BESTLINE PRODUCTS SECURITIES AND ANTITRUST LITIGATION.
MDL No. 162--Civ.--JLK.
United States District Court,
S.D. Florida.
March 19, 1976.
OPINION AND ORDER DETERMINING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.
HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION
These proceedings constitute the third in a series of complex
cases to be transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation to a single forum for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings and which involve Federal securities law claims by
alleged classes of private litigants against corporations claimed
to have engaged in the offer and sale to the public of distributorships
for their products, which distributorships are alleged to be unregistered
securities in the nature of investment contracts or certificates
of interest in profit-sharing arrangements. [FN1] Like its predecessors,
these proceedings also involve alleged violations of the antifraud
provisions of the Securities *734 Act of 1933 (hereinafter
'Securities Act' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter
'Exchange Act'), as well as violations of various state Blue Sky
laws and common law fraud and deceit.
FN1. On December 15, 1972, approximately 20 private actions, followed
by nearly 100 subsequent tag-along cases, which arose out of the
offer and sale by Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. and Dare To Be Great,
Inc., subsidiaries of Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., of multi-level
distributorships were transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. s 1407
to the Western District of Pennsylvania for consolidated or coordinated
pretrial proceedings. On April 6, 1973, a dozen private actions
followed by several dozen tag-along cases, arising out of the
offer and sale of multi-level distributorships by Holiday Magic,
Inc. and affiliated corporations were transferred to the Northern
District of California for the same purpose. The Transfer Order
in these proceedings was entered on April 29, 1974.
The instant proceedings arise out of the offer and sale by Bestline
Products, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bestline Corporation
(hereinafter collectively referred to as 'Bestline'), of pre-purchase
Direct Distributorships contracts or agreements (hereinafter referred
to as 'Direct Distributorships') for the sale and distribution
to the consuming public of its line of personal and home care
products. Most of the individual actions consolidated in this
judicial district assert that the Bestline Direct Distributorships
are securities in the nature of investment contracts or certificates
of interest in a profit-sharing arrangement, and that they were
offered, sold and distributed unlawfully inasmuch as they were
neither registered nor accompanied by a prospectus filed in compliance
with the rules of the Securities & Exchange Commission. [FN2]
Each such action seeks rescission of the distributorship agreements,
as well as damages for fraud in connection with the sale thereof,
and reasonable attorneys' fees. Some 40,000 persons are alleged
to have purchased or invested in Bestline Direct Distributorships
from late 1967 until August 10, 1973, in connection with which
such persons paid Bestline an aggregate sum of nearly $120 million.
Of those persons, less than 6,000 remain active as Bestline distributors.
FN2. The Defendants have never disputed that Bestline Direct Distributorships
were unregistered, or that their offer, sale and distribution
occurred by the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
including the mails. Admissions to that effect were made in response
to the Piambino Plaintiffs' First Request For Admissions filed
herein.
A multitude of Defendants are named in the numerous suits, most
of whom are present or former officers, directors or controlling
shareholders of Bestline, or persons who held the field (as distinguished
from Home Office or Headquarters) positions of Assistant Vice
President, Regional Director and Area Coordinator. [FN3] Bestline's
officers, directors and controlling shareholders are alleged to
have controlled and directed Bestline in its unlawful course of
conduct, and together with its field representatives are also
charged with aiding and abetting and participating in the alleged
unlawful conduct by implementing the actual offer, sale and distribution
of Bestline's Direct Distributorships throughout the country.
In addition, various lawyers and a law firm which served as Bestline's
General Counsel are charged with aiding and abetting the offer,
sale and distribution of the Bestline Direct Distributorships,
as well as the alleged fraud in connection therewith.
FN3. Assistant Vice Presidents and Regional Directors, together
with Home Office officials, constitute what in Bestline's parlance
is referred to as its 'Corporate Team'.
The original suit filed in this judicial district, and the lead
suit in the consolidated proceedings, was brought by Florida residents
Peter Piambino, Joseph F. Kucklick, Marilyn Koslen, Robert M.
Ernst and Michael J. Gardner (hereinafter referred to as the 'Piambino
Plaintiffs') as a class action. On November 22, 1974, upon motion
of the Piambino Plaintiffs, this Court ordered that the Piambino
case should proceed as a class action on behalf of a class of
Plaintiffs consisting of all persons who purchased or invested
in Direct Distributorship contracts or agreements, or their equivalents,
who never qualified as General Distributors, and who have not
re-ordered products from Bestline since May 22, 1974. [FN4]
FN4. General Distributors were excluded from the Plaintiff class
because, by definition, they were paid fees, bonuses, commissions
or rewards for successfully recruiting Direct Distributors and
may be alleged to be brokers or dealers with respect to the Bestline
Direct Distributorships, thereby creating a possible conflict
of interests within the Plaintiff class. Likewise, those Direct
Distributors who repurchased Bestline products within six months
preceding the class action order were excluded on the assumption
that such persons remain active as distributors and may have an
interest in Bestline's financial survival which conflicts with
that of inactive Direct Distributors. Class members who previously
received refunds or were part of a restitution plan arrived at
in negotiations between Bestline and the Attorneys General of
several states were excluded for obvious reasons.
*735 By stipulation between the Piambino Plaintiffs and
the Defendants, the latter of which sought to avoid having notice
of the pendency of the class action sent to all 40,000 present
and former distributors within the Plaintiff class because of
the alleged disruptive effect it would have an Bestline's on-
going business, a Notice of Pendency of Class Action was approved
by this Court and sent by First Class mail only to those 10,000
members of the Plaintiff class who purchased or invested in Bestline
Direct Distributorships after May 1, 1972, thereby embracing the
calendar year preceding the earliest of those lawsuits transferred
to this judicial district by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, and as to which persons the one-year limitation on
actions contained in Securities Act s 13 does not apply. All class
members whose Securities Act s 12(1) claims were not thereby time-barred
would be entitled to the remedy of rescission if this Court determined
that the Bestline Direct Distributorships were securities, while
the nearly 30,000 remaining class members would be relegated to
claims arising out of alleged violations by the Defendants of
the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act, the Exchange
Act and the rules and regulations of the Securities & Exchange
Commission, as to which claims this Court denied class status
except insofar as they involve an adjudication of whether the
Bestline Direct Distributorships are securities. It was also stipulated
that upon any determination by this Court that the Bestline Direct
Distributorships constituted securities, the remaining portion
of the Plaintiff class would be notified of such a ruling and
would also be apprised of the effect thereof an their individual
rights, including their right to initiate separate actions. In
consideration of deferring notice to the remaining 30,000 class
members until after any such ruling by this Court, the Defendants
agreed to pay all costs of the deferred notice, while the Piambino
Plaintiffs paid the cost of preparing and mailing the initial
notice.
In March of 1975, this Court denied various Motions to Dismiss
the class action which raised numerous objections to the Piambino
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Compalint, as well as Motions For Summary
Judgment filed by several Defendants. [FN5] This Court believed
that the Motions For Summary Judgment were at that time premature
because of the then undeveloped state of the record.
FN5. The disposition of the Motions to Dismiss and earlier Motions
For Summary Judgment is reported at CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. P95,070
(S.D.Fla., March 21, 1975).
Thereafter, the parties engaged in nearly twelve (12) months
of extensive discovery. Thirteen separate sets of Interrogatories
were propounded to the various Defendants and answered. Numerous
Requests for Admissions and accompanying Interrogatories were
served upon the Defendants and answered. Thirty-six Depositions
on Oral Examination were taken which ran to in excess of 4,500
pages, virtually all of which were of Defendants in these proceedings
during four week-long sessions in San Francisco and San Jose,
California, Washington, D.C. and Miami, Florida. This member of
the Court personally presided over nearly three weeks of said
depositions with the permission of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation in order to expedite the completion of discovery and
eliminate countless motions by various parties to compel discovery.
The Interrogatories, Requests For Admissions and Depositions on
Oral Examination of the parties and witnesses extended to the
furthest reaches of Bestline's operation, as well as businesses
subsequently organized or controlled by its present and former
principals, and many former Corporate Team members.
Upon completion of the aforesaid discovery, the Piambino Plaintiffs
moved this Court pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 56 to enter partial summary
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff class, and against the Defendants,
on the sole issue of whether the Bestline Direct Distributorships
are securities in the nature of investment contracts. Although
the Piambino Plaintiffs have suggested several theories to reach
the legal conclusion *736 that the Direct Distributorships
constituted securities within the meaning of the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act, the only theory pursued by them in support
of their First Motion For Partial Summary Judgment is based in
substantial part upon an application of the law expressed by the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon in Securities
& Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
348 F.Supp. 766 (D.Or.1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94 S.Ct. 117, 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1974),
followed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Securities &
Exchange Commission v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473
(5th Cir. 1974), and also followed by at least two District Courts
in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Bull Investment Group,
Inc., CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. P95,010 (D.Mass., March 10, 1975), and
Securities & Exchange Commission v. JET Travel Services, Inc.,
CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. P95,317 (M.D.Fla., Aug. 29, 1975). All of the
foregoing cases applied the Federal securities laws to multi-level
sales organizations.
In response to the Piambino Plaintiffs' First Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment, the principal Defendants joined in their own
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment which sought dismissal of
these proceedings on the limited grounds that because the Plaintiff
class members received soap products from Bestline in consideration
of their investment, as a matter of law no security can be found
to exist.
The Piambino Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants' Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment should be denied, and further submit
that there is no genuine issue as to the material facts relevant
to the entire issue of whether the Bestline Direct Distributorships
constitute securities in the nature of an investment contract
within the meaning of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,
and that partial summary judgment on that issue should be entered
by this Court in favor of the Plaintiff class, and against the
Defendants. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we agree.
APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL SECURITIES AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT LAW
[1] Since November 24, 1971, it has been clear that multi-level
sales organizations may be subject to the Federal securities laws.
[FN6] On that date, the Securities & Exchange Commission (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Commission') issued its Release No. 5211,
entitled 'Applicability of the Securities Laws to Multi-Level
Distributorship and Pyramid Sales Plans'. 17 C.F.R. 231.5211.
In that Release, the Commission advanced its view that the Federal
securities laws may be applicable to certain multi-level sales
organizations, and thereafter commenced several successful enforcement
actions based upon that contention. Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F.Supp. 766
(D.Or.1972), 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821, 94 S.Ct. 117, 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1974); Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1974); Securities & Exchange Commission v. Bull Investment
Group, Inc., CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. P95,010 (D.Mass., Mar. 10, 1975);
and Securities & Exchange Commission v. JET Travel Services,
Inc., CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. P95,317 (M.D.Fla., Aug. 29, 1975). [FN7]
FN6. For an exhaustive discussion of the development of the applicability
of securities laws to multi-level distributorships and pyramid
sales plans, see Pyramid Schemes: Dare To Be Regulated
661 Geo.L.J. 1257 (1973).
FN7. All of the reported decisions involved mutli-level sales
organizations.
Before the decision of the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon in Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., supra, the leading and most-often
cited authority for determining what forms of economic relationships
constitute 'investment contracts' within the meaning of the Federal
securities laws was the decision of the Supreme Court in Securities
& Exchange Commission *737 v. W. J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 90 L.Ed. 1244 (1946). In its opinion
in the Howey case, the Supreme Court stated that '. . . an investment
contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third-party . . ..' 328 U.S. at 298--299,
66 S.Ct. at 1103, 90 L.Ed. at 1249.
After the decision in Howey, the Commission, as well as the Courts
which subsequently applied the law announced therein, expressed
their recognition that the significant wording in the Howey definition
of an investment contract was not the word 'solely', but rather
the word 'efforts'.
The decision of the Oregon Court was the first to apply the reasoning
that the word 'solely' in the Howey decision did not relate to
the quantum of the investor's efforts, but the relative quality
of the efforts contributed by the investor and the promoter, or
a third person. The reasoning of the Oregon Court was compelled
by the Howey Court's earlier admonition that the definition of
a security '. . . embodies a flexible rather than a static principle,
one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of money of others on
the promise of profits.' 328 U.S. at 299, 66 S.Ct. at 1103, 90
L.Ed. at 1250.
The Oregon Court accorded to the Howey test the degree of flexibility
originally contemplated by the Supreme Court to effect the important
remedial purposes of the Federal securities laws, without plying
uncharted waters by adopting the approaches taken by several state
courts in the application of their Blue Sky laws, or the reasoning
of the Commission in Release No. 5211, which relied heavily upon
such decisions. [FN8]
FN8. Likewise, the Supreme Court declined the invitation in United
Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 44
L.Ed.2d 621, 43 U.S.L.W. 4792 (1975), to import the 'risk capital'
theory into Federal securities jurisprudence.
The effort of the Oregon Court to apply the Howey test to the
Dare To Be Great multi-level sales scheme devised by Florida promoter
Glenn W. Turner was subsequently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and followed by the Fifth Circuit in Securities
& Exchange Commission v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., supra,
which reversed the decision of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia because that Court emphasized
the quantum of the investor's efforts, rather than the relative
quality thereof, in evaluating another Turner scheme. In affirming
the decision of the Oregon Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated:
We hold . . . that the definition of securities should be a flexible
one, the word 'solely' should not be read as a strict or literal
limitation on the definition of an investment contract, but rather
must be construed realistically . . ..
We adopt a more realistic test, whether the efforts made by those
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success
of the enterprise. 474 F.2d at 482.
And in reversing the Georgia Court, the Fifth Circuit held likewise.
497 F.2d at 485.
The direction charted by the Oregon Court, and followed by the
Ninth and Fifth Circuits in elaborating upon the Howey test, received
recent expression in United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 851--54, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 2060--61, 44 L.Ed.2d 621, 632--33,
43 U.S.L.W. 4742, 4747 (June 17, 1975), wherein the Court snythesized
the law relating to investment contracts and restated the Howey
principle in the following language: 'The touchstone (of an investment
contract) is the presence of an investment in a common venture
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived
from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others (Emphasised
added)'. By focusing on the quality of the efforts of others,
the Supreme Court *738 read the word 'solely' out of the
Howey test, it having become so much surplusage, thereby according
to its prior Howey decision the flexibility originally intended.
[2] A review of the decisions of the District and Appellate Courts
including the Supreme Court, in recent cases applying the Howey-generated
test for an investment contract reveals four essential elements
which must be found to be present in any economic relationship
to give rise to the existence of an investment contract, thereby
bringing such relationships into the ambit of Federal securities
regulation. Those elements are: (1) An investment of money, or
tender of initial value; (2) in a common enterprise or venture;
(3) with a reasonable expectation of profits; (4) to be derived
from the undeniably significant, or essential managerial or entrepreneurial
efforts of others which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.
[3][4] The Piambino Plaintiffs ask this Court to measure the
material facts developed in these proceedings against a yardstick
comprised of the foregoing elements of an investment contract.
Based upon established principles of law applicable to summary
judgments under F.R.Civ.P. 56, they insist, and we agree, that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact with respect
to the issue of whether the Bestline Direct Distributorships constitute
investment contracts within the meaning of the Federal securities
laws. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464,
82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). In so doing, we draw all reasonable
inferences derivable from such facts favorably to the Defendants.
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8
L.Ed.2d 176 (1962).
In applying the applicable principles of the Federal securities
laws and settled principles of summary judgment law to the facts
involved in these proceedings, we note at the outset that virtually
all of the facts of record herein are contained in a multitude
of responses by the Defendants to discovery initiated by the Piambino
Plaintiffs. There are no independent witnesses whose observations,
knowledge or testimony is relied upon by the Piambino Plaintiffs
in support of their First Motion For Partial Summary Judgment,
and virtually all of the facts material to the so-called 'securities
issue' were elicited by the Piambino Plaintiffs from the Defendants
themselves through reams of discovery documents, including lengthy
depositions, which touched upon virtually every aspect of Bestline's
business.
The mere extensiveness of the record, however, as well as the
complexity of the facts and theories of law involved in these
proceedings, have been heavily relied upon by the Defendants in
opposing the Piambino Plaintiffs' First Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment. The Defendants argue that there is a plethora of disputed
facts which preclude this Court's determination of the securities
issue by an interlocutory summary adjudication.
Despite the extensiveness of the record, the volume of facts
contained therein, and the variety of far-reaching inferences
which the parties urge this Court to draw therefrom, we have scrupulously
limited this summary disposition of the securities issue to a
consideration of only the material facts of record and the inferences
which may be reasonably drawn therefrom, viewing all such facts
and inferences in a light most favorable to the Defendants. By
this strict and careful application of the standards required
to be applied in summary adjudications, the facts and inferences
to be considered to determine the Piambino Plaintiffs' First Motion
For Partial Summary Judgment are dramatically reduced in number
and scope.
Based upon our detailed review of the record in these proceedings,
carried out in accordance with the foregoing principles applicable
to summary adjudications, we hold that any specific factual controversies
which are asserted in these proceedings involve facts which are
immaterial to the issue of whether Bestline's Direct Distributorships
constitute investment contracts, or the components of that issue
as set forth hereinabove, either because any such facts *739
are irrelevant to the issue before this Court or because they
lack any uniformity of impact upon the class Plaintiffs. Securities
& Exchange Commission v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497
F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974).
With the foregoing principles of law in view, we hereby apply
them to the material facts involved in these proceedings.
BESTLINE'S GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
Bestline's business began in August of 1966 when William E. Bailey
and Jerry G. Brassfield (hereinafter referred to as 'Bailey' and
'Brassfield', respectively), two of the Defendants in these proceedings,
joined forces to organize a multi-level direct sales organization
to sell and distribute a line of bio-degradable soap products
previously developed by one William Boudreau, a chemist. Prior
thereto, Bailey and Brassfield had been associated as distributors
for Holiday Magic, Inc., a multi-level direct sales company involved
in the distribution of cosmetic products, which itself later became
the object of numerous private and public suits and regulatory
action.
Bailey and Brassfield had been involved in multi-level direct
sales organizations prior to their Holiday Magic experience. Both
had participated in the distribution of food supplements as part
of the Nutri-Bio organization, and Bailey, together with William
Penn Patrick, the founder of Holiday Magic, Inc., made an unsuccessful
prior joint effort to establish a similar company in the corporate
form of Ad-Mark, which later became insolvent.
Bestline was a successful venture from its inception. Led by
Bailey and Brassfield, with the assistance of other persons who
had multi-level direct selling experience, Bestline began the
distribution of its line of bio- degradable soap products through
a fledgling network of independent distributors who occupied various
levels of its multi-level sales organization. Bestline grew rapidly
and in October of 1968, in order to share the ownership of the
company with other loyal and devoted participants in its direct
sales program, Bailey and Brassfield organized the Bestline Corporation
and sold their interest in Bestline Products, Inc. to the new
corporation for $10 million, also retaining majority ownership
of that new company, while admitting others to minority ownership.
Until August of 1973, Bailey at all times remained the chief
executive officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Bestline,
while Brassfield departed the organization in 1970, either as
a result of a dispute over company policy or to seek greener pastures
where he could achieve his own brand of independence. Bestline
grew both in the number of distributors promoting and distributing
its products, as well as geographically, and eventually was operating
in all fifty states and several foreign countries.
During Bestline's growth and development, it attracted the attention
of various law enforcement officials and regulatory agencies,
including the Federal Trade Commission. Early in its history,
Bestline entered into a consent decree with the Federal Trade
Commission wherein it agreed to cease and desist from certain
alleged unfair trade practices in connection with the recruitment
of new distributors, and responded likewise to similar charges
initiated by various state Attorneys General. As a result, occasional
changes were made in Bestline's multi-level sales program claimed
to bring it into conformity with applicable state and Federal
laws. Whether it successfully did so is not within the province
of this Court to determine, nor were the changes made material
to the issues in these proceedings.
In 1973, the Attorney General of the State of California obtained
a civil judgment against Bestline, as well as certain individual
Defendants herein, in the amount of $11 million arising out of
violations by Bestline of California laws relating to deceptive
trade practices. The company promptly filed an Original Petition
under Chapter XI of the National Bankruptcy Act and sought the
protection of the Federal Courts, but subsequently withdrew its
petition *740 after it successfully negotiated with the
California Attorney General an arrangement to pay the $11 million
judgment over a number of years, and after Brassfield effected
a successful tender offer to acquire control of the company. In
connection therewith, Bailey resigned and has remained retired
from the business, while Bestline ostensibly eliminated the objectionable
features of its multi-level direct sales plan and continues to
do business through several thousand distributors.
Despite Bestline's travails, it grew to have some of the earmarks
of a successful national business enterprise. Its initial meager
line of cleaning agents and home care products expanded to 16
such products by March of 1972, six of which were manufactured
in one or both of Bestline's manufacturing facilities in San Jose,
California and Elk Grove Village, Illinois. Each such facility
encloses in excess of 60,000 square feet, and the company rented
or leased other regional distribution centers for its products.
The remaining products were manufactured by others for Bestline
in accordance with its specifications.
Bestline executives were transported throughout the United States
on corporate aircraft and Corporate Team meetings sometimes took
place on the company yacht, or at its ranch in northern California.
Indeed, at its acme, Bestline's chief executive officer, William
E. Bailey, received the Horatio Alger Award voted to successful
entrepreneurs who exemplify the 'American dream', which dream,
coincidentally, Bestline claimed to offer to prospective distributors.
Bestline's officers' individual annual compensation ran into
the hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars, and Corporate
Team members experienced annual earnings into six figures. By
virtue of their earnings, they were eligible to be inducted into
either the 'Chairman's Club', or the 'President's Club', depending
upon the magnitude of their success, as well as those of Bestline's
distributors who qualified, and their status was constantly held
out as an example to Bestline's network of independent distributors
who were exhorted to do likewise. Such 'success stories' were
an essential element in Bestline's promotion of the business opportunity
offered by participation in its National Marketing Plan.
THE BESTLINE NATIONAL MARKETING PLAN
Central to Bestline's success, as well as its past legal problems,
was its 'National Marketing Plan' which consisted of a network
of independent distributors who functioned at various levels in
its direct-sales organization.
For the most part, the Bestline National Marketing Plan was implemented
through a heirarchy of three levels of independent distributors.
Persons at the lowest or middle level were denominated 'Local
Distributors', [FN9] while those at the second or middle level
were denominated 'Direct Distributors'. Those at the third and
highest level of attainment were called 'General Distributors'.
Neither the Local nor General Distributorships are involved in
these proceedings. Any Bestline distributor could sell Bestline
products anywhere in the United States, without limitation.
FN9. Early in Bestline's history, the lowest level, later known
as a Local Distributorship, was characterized by two levels successively
denominated Sub-Distributor and Retailer. Ultimately recognizing
that the two levels were not functionally unique, Bestline consolidated
them into the single position of Local Distributor. Like the Local
Distributorship, neither of its predecessors are involved in these
proceedings.
The Local Distributor was never required by Bestline to make
any significant investment of money to procure his position and
to exercise the rights attendant thereto. [FN10] The Local Distributor
was eligible to sell Bestline products to the consuming public
at retail prices and purchased them through his sponsoring Direct
Distributor at a discount, the difference being his or her commission.
[FN11] He could also recruit other Local *741 Distributors
who could effect such sales for him.
FN10. The Local Distributor qualified as such by paying $5 annual
association dues. No product purchase was required.
FN11. The Local Distributor's commission rate was progressive
in nature, ranging from 30% to 52%, depending upon his personal
sales during any calendar month. The Local Distributor received
the 52% discount (the same as that enjoyed by a pre-purchase Direct
Distributor) when his monthly sales exceeded $4,800. If he attained
$5,600 in sales, the Local Distributor became a Direct Distributor,
having 'worked-in' to that position.
The Direct Distributor, on the other hand, was required to pre-purchase
a substantial quantity of Bestline products and sales aids in
order to qualify for his position and to exercise the rights attendant
thereto. [FN12] Such rights included purchasing Bestline products,
in some cases, at a greater discount than the Local Distributor,
[FN13] as well as the right to 'build an organization' of Local
Distributors on whose selling efforts he could earn a profit.
Of greatest significance to these proceedings, however, is the
right vested in the Direct Distributor to recruit other Direct
Distributors and thereby qualify to elevate himself to the position
of General Distributor and to receive certain monetary bonuses
or rewards in connection therewith. [FN14]
FN12. The actual dollar amount required to be paid to Bestline
varied from time to time, but averaged in excess of $3,000. The
range of variations is immaterial to the fundamental issues involved
in these proceedings.
FN13. The Direct Distributor purchased Bestline products at a
purported 52% discount rate.
FN14. In their Briefs, the Defendants criticize the Piambino Plaintiffs
for assimilating the Direct and General Distributorships insofar
as recruiting activities, and compensation therefor, are involved.
However, both positions involved the recruitment of new Direct
Distributors, the only difference being that the Direct Distributor
who successfully recruited two new Direct Distributors received
no remuneration therefor, because the two successive recruitments
merely qualified him to become a General Distributor. Thereafter,
successive recruitments accorded the distributor a direct pecuniary
benefit.
The General Distributorship could be attained only by those persons
who first qualified as Direct Distributors and satisfied certain
other requirements. The General Distributor had the right to purchase
Bestline products at the greatest available discount, [FN15] and
to 'build an organization' of Direct Distributors and Local Distributors
beneath him on whose selling and recruiting efforts he could earn
a profit.
FN15. The General Distributor purchased products from Bestline
at a purported 60% discount.
Despite the formality of their separate designations, Direct
and General Distributorships are not fundamentally unique or discrete
entities. Although they are separated by a differential of 8%
in the respective rates of discount at which they purchase Bestline
products, both Direct and General Distributors may sell directly
to the consuming public, or through Local Distributors on whose
selling efforts they can earn a profit. Yet the General Distributorship
cannot be attained independently from a Direct Distributorship,
i.e., a prospective distributor cannot enter the Bestline National
Marketing Plan at its highest level. He must first become a Direct
Distributor, even if only for a brief period of time. The fundamental
difference in character between a General Distributor and a Direct
Distributor is largely based upon the fact that General Distributors
have successively recruited a requisite number of new Direct Distributors
to qualify as such, while Direct Distributors have either not
attempted to recruit new Direct Distributors in requisite number,
or have been largely unsuccessful in any such attempts. In short,
the General Distributorship is to the Direct Distributorship as
a butterfly is to a caterpillar; the same being an advanced state
of maturity or development of the other.
Until January of 1970, a Bestline Direct Distributor could qualify
as a General Distributor by recruiting a new pre-purchase Direct
Distributor to replace himself in his sponsoring General Distributor's
'organization', and by paying to Bestline a $2,750 'release fee',
ostensibly to release himself from his General Distributor's organization
and to compensate that General Distributor for the loss of commissions
which he would experience when the released Direct Distributor
left the releasing General Distributor's organization to head
his own organization as a new General Distributor. Bestline
*742 paid $2,250 of the $2,750 release fee to the rising Direct
Distributor's former General Distributor who recruited or sponsored
the released Direct Distributor in the first instance.
After January of 1970, the payment of release fees was discontinued,
and the upwardly-mobile Direct Distributor could satisfy the requirements
necessary to rise to General Distributor by first recruiting a
new Direct Distributor to replace himself in his sponsoring General
Distributor's organization, by generating sales volume of $5,000
in a single month, [FN16] and paying a $600 fee to Bestline for
attendance at a so-called 'General Distributor's School'. The
additional requirements for advancement which replaced the release
fee, however, fell far short of compensating for the income which
the release fee had accorded General Distributors.
FN16. The requisite sales volume could be generated by simply
recruiting a second Direct Distributor for the sponsor's own organization,
or by relying on either his own or his Local Distributors' retail
sales, if any, or both. A later variation of the process of becoming
a pre-purchase Direct Distributor involved the purchase of $500
of Bestline products directly from the Direct Distributor's sponsoring
General Distributor, or his sponsor's sponsoring General Distributor
if the sponsor is only a Direct Distributor, and the balance of
the pre-purchase requirement from Bestline. Although no motivation
is assigned to this variation, it made it possible for a pre-purchase
Direct Distributor to dispose of his entire initial inventory
in $500 increments to newly-recruited Direct Distributors (after
the first two such recruitments qualified him as a General Distributor)
thereby recouping his investment without ever having to sell Bestline
products to the consuming public.
The establishment of the Special Incentive Bonus (SIB) plan responded
to the need to fill the void left by the abandonment of the release
fee. Special Incentive Bonuses were paid to General Distributors
annually and were determined on a progressive basis by the annual
sales volume in Bestline products for which the General Distributor
was responsible, directly or indirectly. Because of its unique
'profit-sharing' qualities (Bestline referred to it as a profit-sharing
plan), the Special Incentive Bonus plan especially highlights
the distinctive feature of the Bestline National Marketing Plan,
which was, at every level, the payment of bonuses or commissions
to distributors based upon 'product movement' measured in 'Refund
Bonus Volume' (RBV), a fictitious value assigned to Bestline products
upon which commissions and bonuses were computed.
Product movement effected by Local Distributors was necessarily
between the Local Distributor and his customer. No commissions
or bonuses were paid by Bestline to the Local Distributor. The
Local Distributor purchased Bestline products from his sponsoring
Direct Distributor at a discount, and could sell them at whatever
price he chose, subject to contract restrictions, but without
any real control by Bestline over the retail prices. Because Local
Distributors make no initial investment, either in product or
otherwise, this aspect of Bestline's National Marketing Program
does not run afoul of the Federal securities laws, nor is it alleged
by the Piambino Plaintiffs to offend those laws.
Product movement effected by Direct and General Distributors,
however, is more complex. Inasmuch as Direct and General Distributors
are exhorted to 'build their organizations' by recruiting yet
other distributors who pre-purchase substantial quantities of
Bestline products, the commissions and bonuses paid in connection
with the substantial product movement from Bestline into the hands
of such new distributors constitutes remuneration for the recruitment
of others into the Bestline National Marketing Plan. Although
the concept of 'product movement' obscured any distinction between
the movement of Bestline products into the hands of the consuming
public as against movement into the hands of distributors, or
among them, Bestline's parlance made a distinction between 'retail'
and 'wholesale' business. Retail business involved precisely that,
product movement into the hands of the consuming public. Wholesale
business, on the other hand, involved product movement between
distributors, or from Bestline into the hands *743 of new
distributors. The latter component of wholesale business, of course,
was generated by recruitment activities. Commissions and bonuses
were paid on all product movement generated by Bestline distributors
measured in RBV, without distinction between wholesale or retail
business. By creating the fictions of 'product movement' and 'wholesale
business', Bestline could state in its Business Opportunity Booklet
provided to prospective distributors that 'No compensation of
any kind will be paid for the solicitation or recruitment of others'.
This self-serving declaration, however, relies upon those important
terms to put a gloss on the underlying recruiting or 'organization
building' transactions which, in fact generated the 'product movement'
or 'wholesale business' on which commissions and bonuses were
paid.
Every Bestline distributor, at whatever level, had a 'sponsor'
to whose 'organization' he was assigned, even if the sponsor
resided hundreds or thousands of miles away. Each Direct Distributor
Application required an identification of the applicant's 'sponsoring'
distributor for the purpose of paying commissions or bonuses on
the product movement generated by his recruitment. Bestline thereby
developed a complex system of accounting for the responsibility
for sponsorship of new distributors which was ultimately computerized,
and the hard-copy output which recorded the payment of commissions
and overrides on product movement through the chain of distributors
was referred to in Bestline's parlance as 'linkage reports'. Bestline's
computer also generated 3% and 8% 'commission statements' to its
distributors, from which data the company also paid the commissions
set forth therein.
Upon review of the foregoing facts, all of which were elicited
by the Piambino Plaintiffs from the Defendants themselves, this
Court discerns four different methods by which Bestline distributors
could profit from the recruitment of new distributors. Those four
methods included: (1) the release fee; (2) the 'standard' commission;
(3) the 'override' commission; and (4) the Special Incentive Bonus
(SIB).
The release fee practice, which was abandoned in 1970, was the
simplest method by which the Bestline investor profited from the
recruitment aspect of the National Marketing Plan. As discussed
previously, a rising Direct Distributor was required to pay a
$2,750 fee to Bestline as a condition precedent to attaining the
status of a General Distributor. Bestline retained $500 and paid
$2,250 to the Direct Distributor's sponsoring General Distributor.
By this technique, Bestline induced advancement from Direct Distributor
to General Distributor. The 'release fee', in effect, was a deferred
method of compensating one distributor for sponsoring another
distributor, subject only to the condition that the recruiting
and the recruited distributors must ultimately become General
Distributors.
Because of the differential in the rates of discount between
General and Direct Distributors (60% and 52%, respectively), each
sponsoring General Distributor was entitled to an 8% standard
commission on 'product movement' to or through each Direct Distributor
sponsored by him, including the Direct Distributor's initial pre-purchase
of Bestline products. The fact that the Direct Distributor may
reside hundreds or thousands of miles away would not deprive his
sponsoring General Distributor of his vested right to receive
the 8% standard commission. In many cases, a new pre-purchase
Direct Distributor would request that only half (or none) of an
initial product inventory be shipped to him. In such cases, it
made no difference as to the payment of the 8% standard commission
on such product movement. The General Distributor was still entitled
to receive the commission, and Bestline paid it, even though the
products may never have physically moved at all.
In each case, Bestline accounted for all such transactions, received
the funds and disbursed the commission payments to the beneficiaries
of the program.
In addition to the 8% standard commission, Bestline offered and
paid a 3% override commission to the sponsor of a sponsoring distributor,
i.e., the distributor once-removed *744 up the chain of
distributors. [FN17] The sponsor of a sponsoring distributor was
entitled to the 3% override commission solely by virtue of his
initial sponsorship of the sponsoring distributor, even though
he may have had no involvement in the subsequent recruitment.
As with the 8% standard commission, the 3% override commission
was paid whether the product was shipped or not.
FN17. The 3% override commission was discontinued by Bestline
in 1972.
The system of 3% override commissions was likewise administered
by Bestline, and payments were remitted by the company on a monthly
basis.
After the release fee feature of Bestline's National Marketing
Plan was eliminated in 1970, the 8% standard commission differential
and the 3% override commission remained as the sole inducement
for the Direct Distributor to rise to the General Distributorship
level. Bestline enhanced the attractiveness of advancing to the
General Distributorship position by implementing the Special Incentive
Bonus (SIB) plan. The SIB was represented by Bestline to be a
profit- sharing program.
SIB's were paid on an annual basis to qualifying distributors.
The actual sum or sums of money paid was determined on a progressive
scale as a percentage of product movement measured in RBV. The
greater an individual distributor's annual RBV, the greater would
be his annual SIB expressed as a precentage of the total annual
RBV. Although annual RBV could consist of product movement through
the distributor to the consuming public, it could also consist
of product movement to newly-recruited distributors. No differentiation
was made by Bestline, nor was any attempt made to measure the
quantity of Bestline products which actually flowed to the consuming
public until the so-called 'Cameo' program was developed in 1971
in response to criticism by regulatory agencies that the Bestline
National Marketing Plan resulted in 'garage loading' of its products
in the possession of its distributors.
The average RBV generated by the recruitment of a new Direct
Distributor, who later became a General Distributor, was about
$15,000. [FN18] Whereas under the discontinued release fee program
a General Distributor would be paid a 13% or $2,000 commission
on a Direct Distributor who subsequently advanced to the General
Distributor position, under the SIB program the General Distributor
had to account for at least $36,000 RBV to be eligible for any
commissions at all. At that level, the General Distributor's commission
would 3.3% of his RBV. However, if the General Distributor successfully
accounted for an annual RBV of $200,000, his commission rate would
escalate to 15% of RBV, or $30,000. Thus, the General Distributor
who recruited thirteen new Direct Distributors in any given calendar
year would be in essentially the same position under the SIB plan
as in the discontinued release fee program.
FN18. The figure is attained by aggregating the RBV of each pre-purchase
Direct Distributor's initial product purchase and the product
movement, measured in RBV, generated by meeting all of the requirements
for advancement to the position of General Distributor.
Of course, the new SIB plan had the disadvantage of making it
necessary for the sponsoring General Distributor to recruit a
greater number of Direct Distributors in order to receive the
equivalent bonus expressed either as a percentage of RBV or in
dollars, but it had the advantage of paying to a General Distributor
a commission for the recruitment of a new Direct Distributor,
even where the Direct Distributor subsequently failed to advance
to the General Distributor level.
When the SIB plan is viewed in conjunction with the requirement
that an advancing Direct Distributor recruit a new Direct Distributor
to replace himself in his sponsor's 'organization', it appears
that his sponsoring General Distributor is credited with the RBV
for the ensuing product movement, and that all such RBV is aggregated
for the purpose of determining the *745 sponsoring General
Distributor's annual SIB. Hence, the General Distributor can qualify
for and be paid an annual SIB based solely upon the recruiting
efforts of Direct Distributors in his organization who seek to
advance themselves to the position of General Distributors, and
who thereby seek to be eligible for the 'windfall' profits of
the scheme. [FN19]
FN19. The illustration carries the proposition to an extreme conclusion.
It is intended only to illustrate the point, and is not relied
upon in making disposition of the securities issue herein by interlocutory
summary adjudication. This Court has been scrupulous to avoid
drawing any inferences from the material facts which assume that
Bestline's product movement was generated primarily from recruitment,
rather than retail sales, or vice versa. The actual relationship
between these two aspects of Bestline's National Marketing Plan,
insofar as the respective emphasis between them is concerned,
is not a material issue herein.
In short, the abandonment of the release fee and the substitution
of the SIB plan changed nothing except the form of the transaction.
If anything, it removed from the conditions precedent to the payment
of such bonuses any requirement that a General Distributor shepherd
a newly-recruited Direct Distributor through the recruitments
necessary to be accomplished by him to advance to the General
Distributorship position, further eliminating, as a practical
matter, any need for the General Distributor to exert any efforts
at all.
Based upon the foregoing analysis of the facts, it is plain that
the Direct and General Distributorships possess at least two attributes
of the four which are necessary components of an investment contract.
The Direct Distributor, through his pre-purchase of Bestline products,
pays money to Bestline as a condition precedent to his ultimate
eligibility as a General Distributor to receive payments in the
form of profit on his investment. It is also undisputed that Bestline
managed the entire system of receiving, accounting for and disbursing
such profits. Bestline's centralized administration of its network
of independent distributors thereby also constitutes a significant
element of the participation of its distributors in a 'common
enterprise or venture', or the third of the four necessary components
of an investment contract.
In their countering Motion For Summary Judgment, the principal
Defendants maintain that there is no genuine issue as to the fact
that each pre-purchase Direct Distributor received soap products
and sales aids in exchange for his or her investment in Bestline,
but argue that upon that fact alone an investment of money is
negated. The moving Defendants thereby urge this Court to adopt
a mechanical and simplistic notion of the Federal securities laws
which prefers form over substance and ignores the economic realities
of the transaction in Bestline Direct Distributorships.
Unquestionably, each member of the Plaintiff class paid money
to Bestline in consideration not only of the quantity of Bestline
products to be shipped to him (or reserved for him), but as a
condition precedent to be eligible to act as a pre-purchase Direct
Distributor, including the exercise of all rights and privileges
attendant thereto. Whether the rights and privileges attendant
to a Bestline Direct Distributorship piggy-backed with the product
pre-purchased, or vice versa, is immaterial to the disposition
of these proceedings. The fact is undisputed that in no way other
than the pre-purchase of Bestline products [FN20] can a Plaintiff
class member be eligible to exercise the rights and privileges
which vest in a Bestline Direct Distributor. Those rights,
*746 and the eligibility of the Plaintiff class members to
exercise them, are a basic and fundamental part of the consideration
for the transaction which forms the economic relationship between
Bestline and the investor. Clearly, the Plaintiff class members
did not purchase thousands of dollars in Bestline products for
their own use or consumption, but for re-distribution to either
the consuming public or other distributors, or simply to store
in their garages while they devoted their time to 'building their
organizations', which, in Bestline's parlance, meant the recruitment
of other distributors.
FN20. The possibility of a Local Distributor becoming a 'work-in'
Direct Distributor was discussed previously at Note 11, infra.
For the purpose of this analysis, the pre-purchase and work-in
methods of attaining Direct Distributorship status are indistinct.
Work-in Direct Distributors are not members of the Plaintiff class
by definition. The former qualified by expending either his own
or borrowed funds to pre-purchase Bestline products in required
quantity, while the latter pre-sells in a single calendar month
essentially the same volume of Bestline products required to be
pre-purchased by the former. The point made is that the rights
and privileges of a Direct Distributorship were not offered by
Bestline separate and apart from the specified volume of product
movement, however, created. Such rights were neither 'given away',
nor sold for a separate consideration.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the transaction between
Bestline and the Plaintiff class members involved an investment
of money, or tender of initial value, and deny the principal Defendants'
Motion For Summary Judgment on that issue.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BESTLINE NATIONAL MARKETING PLAN
Bestline's field organization, and its function, like its centralized
administrative or clearing-house services, is an integral part
of its National Marketing Plan.
Shortly after its inception, as its recruitment of new distributors
grew both numerically and geographically, Bestline assembled a
field organization to continue and further expand its business.
There eventually developed a hierarchy of field positions responsible
to the Vice President in charge of sales in the Home Office or
corporate headquarters at San Jose, California.
Immediately under the Vice President, and directly responsible
to him, Bestline established the position of Assistant Vice President.
There were six Assistant Vice Presidents who were assigned specific
geographic territories to supervise, usually consisting of seven
to nine states. Immediately beneath the Assistant Vice Presidents
in rank, Bestline established the position of Regional Director,
while persons were also assigned specific smaller geographic territories
to supervise, usually consisting of a single state or part thereof.
And beneath the Regional Director in responsibility, Bestline
created the position of Area Coordinator, and sometimes Assistant
Area Coordinator. Each Area Coordinator reported to a Regional
Director, and was assigned to a specific geographic territory
to supervise, usually consisting of several smaller medium-sized
cities, or parts of large ones. Their duties included organizing
and presenting Opportunity Meetings, conducting training sessions
for distributors, supplying data to Bestline's Home Office for
its Corporate Calendar and coordinating and effectuating company
policy in the field. Assistant Vice Presidents and Regional Directors
were appointed and paid by Bestline, although they could also
continue to perform as distributors if they so desired, and some
did. Area Coordinators were appointed by Bestline and paid through
its Regional Directors. The method of compensation of Bestline's
field representatives changed from time to time, but always included
in substantial part a commission based upon 'product movement'
within their assigned areas, which, of course, included the movement
of Bestline products pre-purchased by newly-recruited Direct Distributors.
Key Home Office officials, Assistant Vice Presidents and Regional
Directors, but not Area Coordinators, came to be known as members
of Bestline's 'Corporate Team'. Corporate Team meetings were held
monthly in a single location in the United States, at which Home
Office officials, and sometimes legal counsel, reviewed existing
company policies with respect to the National Marketing Plan,
announced new policies, admonished the Corporate Team to enforce
all policies and generally motivated each other. A consistent
theme in Corporate Team meetings was enforcing adherence to scripts
provided by Bestline for use at Opportunity Meetings to which
distributors invited guests to become acquainted with the Bestline
business opportunity as part of the exhorted goal of each distributor
to 'build his organization', as well as adherence to the recommended
procedures by which *747 prospects were introduced to Bestline
and its network of distributors, whether through the device of
'Opportunity Meetings' or otherwise.
Like Koscot and Dare To Be Great, [FN21] a key feature of the
Bestline National Marketing Plan was the 'Opportunity Meeting'
which consisted of a gathering of Bestline distributors and prospective
distributors in a hotel or motel meeting room, or any other suitable
meeting-place. The purpose and effect of the Opportunity Meeting
was the creation of an effective vehicle by which distributors
could 'build their organizations' by inviting prospective distributors
to receive a standardized presentation or introduction to Bestline's
products and business opportunity. Although the Opportunity Meetings
may not have been the exclusive vehicle utilized to introduce
Bestline to prospective distributors, it was by far the overwhelmingly
dominant method, the one recommended by the company, and the most
effective, even though it had to be supplemented by the efforts
of individual distributors to consummate sales of new Direct Distributorships
in accordance with guidelines promulgated by Bestline.
FN21. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., supra; Securities & Exchange Commission v. Glenn W.
Turner Enterprises Inc., supra.
Dozens, if not hundreds, of Opportunity Meetings were conducted
almost daily throughout the United States. The time and place
of each Opportunity Meeting was relayed to Bestline's Home Office
through its Corporate Team and assembled into a single regularly-published
and distributed 'Corporate Calendar' for use by its distributors.
By means of this vast network of standardized Opportunity Meetings,
an Omaha distributor could (and was encouraged to) 'build his
organization' by referring friends in Seattle or Miami to a convenient
Opportunity Meeting in their locale. And if the New York or Miami
friend became a pre-purchase Direct Distributor he was assigned
to his sponsor's organization in Omaha, which sponsor would receive
the standard commission paid by Bestline on the product movement
from Bestline to the newly-recruited distributor.
To insure uniformity at each of the thousands of Opportunity
Meetings, Bestline distributed scripts for speakers to use at
such meetings, as well as records, film strips and a Bestline
Business Opportunity Booklet to be delivered to each prospective
distributor. Assistant Vice Presidents, Regional Directors and
Area Coordinators frequently conducted the Opportunity Meetings,
or at least attended them to insure adherence to company policy.
Bestline even employed a firm of private detectives to report
to it as to the adherence to company policy at Opportunity Meetings,
and frequently required electronic recording of such meetings
for review by legal counsel.
In some areas the meetings were organized and paid for by local
'cooperatives' of distributors, usually with the assistance of
an Area Coordinator or Corporate Team member. Co-op members paid
dues which were in turn allocated to the expense of conducting
Opportunity Meetings. A distributor who did not join the co-op,
or whose dues were not current, as a practical matter, could still
attend and bring a prospect for 'his organization', but in some
areas, at least, he would be warned not to come back a second
time if he was not a member in good standing of the cooperative.
There is no genuine issue that the relationship among Bestline,
its Corporate Team members and Area Coordinators, the cooperatives
and the Bestline distributors constituted a common enterprise
or venture, whether for the sale and distribution of Bestline
products to the consuming public, or for the recruitment of new
distributors, and we so hold.
THE INVESTORS' EXPECTATIONS
The pressure point of the application of the principles of Federal
securities and summary judgment law to the facts of these proceedings
involves the 'reasonable expectations' of the class Plaintiffs
with respect to their investment in Bestline Direct *748
Distributorships, including the locus of the undeniably significant
or essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts resulting in
the payment to them of a share of the profits to be derived from
the common enterprise or venture.
The Defendants have strenuously argued that the facts elicited
from them in pretrial discovery unquestionably reveal that the
individual investor is the locus of the undeniably significant
or essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts necessary to
the success of the Bestline National Marketing Plan, and to their
individual financial success. They also contend that no reasonable
investor could expect or conclude otherwise, thereby removing
the Bestline National Marketing Plan from the ambit of the Federal
securities laws. The Piambino Plaintiffs, on the other hand, suggest
that the undeniably significant or essential managerial or entrepreneurial
efforts required in connection with the success of the Bestline
National Marketing Plan repose in Bestline and its Corporate Team
members, including Area Coordinators. In support of their respective
arguments, all of the parties rely upon the extensive factual
record relating to the pre-investment presentations made to the
class Plaintiffs, as well as to the actual operation of the Bestline
National Marketing Plan viewed from a post-investment standpoint,
including a variety of inferences derived therefrom.
[5] The parties' reliance upon this broad range of facts, however,
is misplaced and creates a false or illusory issue in these proceedings.
It is not necessary to a determination of the class Plaintiffs'
expectations for this Court to consider such a broad range of
facts and inferences. The elemental inquiry is the class Plaintiffs'
pre-investment expectations as to the nature of their investments
in Bestline Direct Distributorships, and whether reasonable minds
can differ as to such expectations. [FN22] In short, the business
opportunity offered by participation as a distributor in Bestline's
National Marketing Plan must be viewed through the eyes of the
class Plaintiffs, considering only such facts as were available
to them before they made their individual investment decisions.
FN22. Although these proceedings also involve extensive allegations
of misrepresentations and omissions of material facts in the standardized
presentations of Bestline's business opportunity to prospective
investors, the Piambino Plaintiffs First Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment does not require this Court to determine those issues.
The existence of such misrepresentations and omissions, however,
may in no small measure account for the diametrically opposed
factual contentions of the parties with respect to the operation
of the Bestline National Marketing Plan from a post-investment
viewpoint. The Defendants rely heavily upon their view of how
the Bestline National Marketing Plan operated, rather than how
it was presented to the prospective investors. This inquiry is
necessarily limited to the pre-investment presentations made to
the Plaintiff class, because it was from those presentations that
the class Plaintiffs derived their expectations with respect to
their investment in Bestline Direct Distributorships.
In this regard, it is only necessary that this Court review the
facts as to the mode and manner of interesting class Plaintiffs
in the business opportunity offered by participation in Bestline's
National Marketing Plan, and of presenting that business opportunity
to them, whether at Opportunity Meetings or otherwise. In so doing,
this Court looks not only to the economic substance of the transactions
in Bestline Direct Distributorships, but equally to '. . . what
character the instrument is given . . . by the terms of the offer,
the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out
to the prospect. In the enforcement of an act such as this (Securities
Act), it is not inappropriate that promoters' offerings be judged
as what they were represented to be'. Securities & Exchange
Commission v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352--353,
64 S.Ct. 120, 124, 88 L.Ed. 88, 94 (1943) (quoted approvingly
in Securities & Exchange Commission v. United Benefit Life
Insurance Co., 387 U.S. 202, 211, 87 S.Ct. 1557, 1562, 18 L.Ed.2d
673, 679-- 80 (1967)). In their joint brief, the Defendants accede
to the propriety of the foregoing approach and have urged this
*749 Court to adopt a narrow scope of inquiry limited to the
various forms of Direct Distributorship agreements, Direct Distributorship
qualification forms, the Bestline Business Opportunity Booklet,
the Opportunity Meeting scripts, and product and marketing films.
Such a limitation is appropriate, and this Court has restricted
itself to an analysis of those documents and things with respect
to this aspect of the securities issue, notwithstanding arguments
advanced by all parties to these proceedings based upon a broader
range of facts which, for the foregoing reasons, are immaterial
to the issue.
By circumscribing the inquiry as aforesaid, and confining it
to the review of such material documents and things, we find that
there is no genuine issue as to the fact of what representations
were made to prospective Bestline distributors through standardized
presentations based thereon, whether at formal or informal meetings,
or otherwise, although there is some dispute as to random or spurious
representations made to the named Plaintiffs by other Bestline
distributors and Corporate Team members outside the context of
Bestline's standardized presentations. In reaching this conclusion,
however, we have regarded as immaterial to this summary adjudication
of the securities issue any testimony of the named Plaintiffs
which is based upon such random or spurious representations because
such representations lack any uniformity of impact on the class
Plaintiffs and also because, in view of our finding, they are
surplusage. Such representations merely reinforce expectations
otherwise effectively created in the minds of the reasonable investor
by the standardized pre-investment presentations.
There is no genuine dispute as to the fact that the class Plaintiffs,
as well as thousands of others, were indiscriminately solicited
to be exposed to the Bestline business opportunity, without regard
to their backgrounds, education, training or individual abilities.
The Defendants concede as much, and suggest merely that the quality
of Bestline's training program adequately compensated for any
lack of relevant experience or education, and that 'a person's
desire to succeed and willingness to work far exceed any educational
or business background prior to Bestline.' [FN23] These persons,
drawn 'from all walks of life, ethnic backgrounds, with varied
educations, experience, ages and religious', [FN24] were then
introduced to Bestline's business opportunity, either through
the device of an Opportunity Meeting, or some other formal or
informal presentation based upon guidelines promulgated by Bestline
in its Information Manual, from which presentations they derived
their expectations as to the character of an investment in Bestline
Direct Distributorships.
FN23. Bestline Business Opportunity Booklet (all editions), p.
7.
FN24. This phrase, in several variations, appears in all editions
of the Bestline Business Opportunity Booklet, as well as several
times in each Opportunity Meeting script.
The fact that some Bestline distributors may have obtained 'prospects'
by advertising in 'Help Wanted' columns of local newspapers, by
direct mail, or by striking up conversations on street corners,
or that they may have intentionally refused to explain the Bestline
business opportunity on such first contacts to heighten the prospective
investor's 'curiosity', may betray the motives of the Defendants
in connection with the class Plaintiffs' fraud claims, but the
use of such techniques are not basic to a determination by this
Court as to the expectations created in the minds of the class
Plaintiffs as to the character of their investments in Bestline
Direct Distributorships. Similarly, zealousness at Opportunity
Meetings evidenced by out-pourings of enthusiasm, speakers running
or hurrying to the rostrum, exuberant applause, chanting or singing,
and other conduct of a similar nature, may also bear upon the
Piambino Plaintiffs' allegations of fraud and highpressure salesmanship,
but are immaterial to the basic inquiry involved in this adjudication,
*750 thereby differentiating it somewhat from the decision
of the Koscot and Turner Courts, which involved important fraud
questions. The elucidation in those decisions of the high-pressure
sales tactics of the promoters was directed to the Commission's
claims of violations of the antifraud provisions of the Federal
securities laws. In contrast, this Court is called upon only to
resolve the limited issue of whether there is any genuine controversy
as to the fact that Bestline's pre-investment standardized presentations,
in their material aspects, created in the class Plaintiffs' minds
the reasonable expectation that an investment in Bestline Direct
Distributorships would lead to profits to be derived from the
undeniably significant or essential managerial or entrepreneurial
efforts of others which affect the failure or success of the common
enterprise or venture.
The apparent lack of sophistication of the class Plaintiffs herein
contrasts sharply with the decisions of other Courts which have
held that specific franchise agreements involved therein were
not investment contracts within the meaning of the Federal securities
laws, and compares favorably with the decisions of those Courts
which have found otherwise. See e.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River
City Steak, Inc., 324 F.Supp. 640 (D.Colo., 1970), aff'd, 460
F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972) (River City Steak was not an uninformed
investor, but was acquainted with the business it undertook, held
not to involve the offer and sale of an investment contract);
Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King International, Inc., 348 F.Supp.
799 (M.D.Fla.1972) (controlling stockholder of Beefy Trail had
extensive background as a businessman having owned and managed
a retail department store, had an interest in a construction business,
together with his attorney spent a considerable period of time
negotiating with Beefy King over the terms and conditions of the
ultimate purchase of a restaurant and franchise wherein some of
the documents were drafted by his attorney, and was employed as
a consultant to Beefy King actually working daily in its offices
for a period of time, held not to involve the offer and sale of
investment contract). In evaluating the impact of the promoter's
offering on the expectations of the investor, the investor's experience,
training and abilities have always been considered an important
starting point. In some cases it has been the dispositive issue.
In these proceedings, we find that the Bestline National Marketing
Plan was a highly-organized nationwide program addressed to the
population at large, without discrimination or qualification as
to the sophistication of the prospective investors.
There is no question that Bestline's National Marketing Plan
held out to such investors the expectation of profits to be derived
from participation therein. The lure of profits permeates Bestline's
meeting scripts, literature and film strips which comprise its
standardized presentations to prospects for its distributorships.
Even a cursory review of those materials reveals that an expectation
of profits was not only reasonably derivable therefrom, but that
those materials exclude any other reasonable expectation. We are
therefore constrained to conclude that there is no genuine issue
as to the fact that the class Plaintiffs were led to expect that
profits would be derived from an investment in Bestline Direct
Distributorships, and that no reasonable investor could possibly
conclude otherwise. In view of this finding, the disposition issue
involves the reasonable investor's expectations as to the relative
quality of the efforts to be contributed to the common enterprise
or venture in order for him to receive a share of the proceeds
therefrom.
In resolving this crucial issue, it is important to note that
Bestline's Direct Distributorships are fundamentally unlike traditional
business franchises. In a typical business franchise the franchisee
acquires a bundle of legal rights, frequently including the right
to employ in a specific geographic area, a business system developed
by the franchisor, as well as intangible proprietary rights involving
trade secrets, trade names, trademarks and, possibly, patents.
Few franchisors require their franchisees to purchase goods or
services from the franchisor *751 or a designated supplier
in connection with the franchisee's operation of the franchised
business. Although it is possible for an instrument identified
as a franchise to infringe upon the Federal securities laws, traditional
business franchises have been generally held to be beyond the
pale of securities regulation because the franchisee's unit of
what is usually a common enterprise is largely independent of
the success or failure of the franchisor, or other franchisees,
although the franchisor's failure or success may increase the
risk undertaken by the franchisee. In short, in most cases involving
allegations that a business franchise constituted an investment
contract, it has been held that the franchisee's risk is not sufficiently
integrated with that of the franchisor to bring such franchises
within the scope of the Federal securities laws. [FN25]
FN25. This is not to say, however, that some franchises may not
fall within the scope of the Federal securities laws because they
lack other essential features of an investment contract, i.e.,
an investment of money or participation in a common enterprise.
Although distributorships may involve the acquisition by the
distributor of many of the same rights involved in the traditional
business franchise, distributorships generally involve rights
respecting a specific product or product line manufactured or
produced by or on behalf of the offering entity. The nature of
the product and its distribution may require the distributor to
establish and operate a separate or independently integrated business
to sell the product to the distributor's customers, and to service
the product, if necessary. Other distributorships may require
an established place of business, but may not involve a product
which requires the distributor to exercise a service function.
Yet other distributorships may not require either an established
place of business, or a product which involves the distributor
in a service function.
The failure of the manufacturer or producer of a product subject
of a distributorship may or may not destroy the distributor as
an independently viable business entity. Depending upon the nature
of the product involved, the distributor's business may not be
destroyed if it otherwise involves the sale of other products,
or if it is easily adaptable to the sale of other products. On
the other hand, if the product involved is the sole product sold
by the distributor, and if his whole method of operation is inherently
related to that product, the distributor's business will certainly
perish in the face of the manufacturer or producer's failure.
In either event, the distributorship itself is rendered worthless.
Bestline's Direct Distributorships involve a high degree of dependency
upon the success of the company, or integrated risk. Without regard
to the issue of Bestline's participation in the recruitment of
new distributors, the company's standardized presentations lead
to the inevitable expectation by the class Plaintiffs that it
has developed, manufactures and successfully promotes a line of
quality home and personal care products, and that it will continue
to do so for the foreseeable future. An essential part of the
investor's expectations is that the company will provide continuing
assistance to its distributors, and will administer the system
by which commission or bonuses are paid to its distributors in
accordance with the representations contained in its standardized
meeting scripts, literature and film strips. No other interpretation
of those materials is reasonable.
The class Plaintiffs are not manufacturers or producers of soap,
and the terms and conditions of their participation in the Bestline
National Marketing Plan are controlled by Bestline. They expected
not merely to sell soap, but to participate in the National Marketing
Plan. If they had sought merely to sell soap, a Local Distributorship,
which involved no investment, would have done nicely.
Although the class Plaintiffs risk may not be totally integrated
with that of Bestline, the nature of the integration is such that
Bestline's failure would not only render its distributorships
worthless, but would effectively put the distributor out of business
as a separate or independent entity. He may *752 be able
to liquidate his inventory of soap products then on hand, but
mere inventory liquidation is neither business survival nor what
the authorities contemplate as the kind of managerial or enterpreneurial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise
or venture.
We therefore hold that the nature of the relationship between
Bestline and the class Plaintiffs, as it is explained to prospective
investors in the company's standardized presentations, is such
that compels the reasonable expectation that Bestline had in the
past, and would continue for the foreseeable future, to supply
the managerial or enterpreneurial talents, skills and experience
essential to the continuing development, manufacture and promotion
of a salable line of home and personal care products, and to the
management of its multi- level network of distributors as part
of its National Marketing Plan, and that those efforts reasonably
expected by the class Plaintiffs are the essence of the success
of the common enterprise or venture from which they expected to
derive their share of the proceeds. Reasonable minds cannot differ
as to that expectation; it is compelled by Bestline's standardized
presentations to the exclusion of any other reasonable expectation.
The sole remaining issue dispositive of the Piambino Plaintiffs'
First Motion For Partial Summary Judgment is whether the class
Plaintiffs reasonably expected to themselves contribute any essential
managerial or entrepreneurial efforts to derive their share of
the proceeds from the common enterprise or venture.
There is no question that the class Plaintiffs expected to contribute
some efforts, in addition to their money, to receive their share
of the proceeds from the successful operation of Bestline's National
Marketing Plan. None of them expected 'something for nothing'.
Many expected to 'work hard', and some personally expected to
sell Bestline products at retail. All of these expectations are
reasonable inferences to be drawn from Bestline's standardized
presentations. All of them, however, beg the question as to whether
the class Plaintiffs reasonably expected to themselves contribute
the undeniably significant, or essential managerial or enterpreneurial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the common enterprise
or venture.
[6] The fact that the class Plaintiffs could not expect to receive
their share of the proceeds from the common enterprise or venture
unless they contributed some efforts is not inconsistent with
the existence of an investment contract. In this respect, the
Ninth Circuit Court's review of the Howey decision in Securities
& Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
supra, is instructive. In that decision, the Court remarked: 'Let
us assume that in Howey, supra, the sale and service agreements
had provided that the buyer was to buy and plant the citrus trees.
Unless he did so, there would be no crop to cultivate, harvest
and sell, no moneys in which he could share. The essential nature
of the scheme, however, would be the same. He would still be buying,
in exchange for money, trees and planting, a share in what he
hoped would be the company's success in cultivating the trees
and harvesting and marketing the crop. We cannot believe that
the Court would not have held such a scheme to be an investment
contract.' 474 F.2d at 482. The fact that the distributor's efforts
may be necessary to the success or failure of the common enterprise
or venture, or the individual distributor's unit thereof, does
not, however, establish the quality of those efforts. Every retail
merchandising outlet, for example, requires the efforts of sales
personnel to achieve success, as well as secretaries, bookkeepers
and a garden-variety of additional personnel customarily associated
with the operation of a business enterprise. The fact that the
efforts of such persons are necessary, however, does not establish
that those efforts are managerial or enterpreneurial in nature,
or sufficient to significantly affect the failure or success of
the enterprise or venture.
The crux of the decision in Securities & Exchange Commission
v. Glenn W. Turner *753 Enterprises, Inc., supra, is that
if the efforts contributed by the investor are not 'those essential
managerial (or enterpreneurial) efforts which affect the failure
or success of the enterprise', the efforts themselves rise to
no higher status than an investment, different from money only
in kind. The absence of any managerial or entrepreneurial skills
or abilities from the efforts required of investors in the Dare
To Be Great scheme compelled the Ninth Circuit Court to conclude
that the participants in the scheme were sold the idea that they
would get a fixed share in the proceeds from the sale of 'Adventure'
plans, and that '. . . to get that share, he invests three things:
his money, his efforts to find prospects and bring them to the
meetings, and whatever it costs him to create an illusion of his
own affluence'. 474 F.2d at 482. The Turner Court held that the
Dare To Be Great investors' efforts did not rise in quality to
the level of essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts which
affect the success or failure of the common enterprise, and thereby
consisted of nothing more than a further investment to receive
a fixed share of the proceeds from the efforts of Dare To Be Great.
The efforts which the class Plaintiffs in these proceedings reasonably
expected to contribute to the Bestline National Marketing Plan
rises to no higher status.
Every class Plaintiff, with minor exceptions, became a Direct
Distributor in Bestline's National Marketing Plan based upon a
reading of the Bestline Business Opportunity Booklet, standardized
Opportunity Meeting scripts (or variations employed by individual
distributors), testimonials of 'successful' distributors, and
film strips. After 1970, Direct Distributorship qualification
forms required the class Plaintiffs to affirmatively respond to
the inquiries whether they had attended an Opportunity Meeting
and whether they had received and read the Bestline Business Opportunity
Booklet as a condition precedent to their eligibility to become
Direct Distributors.
Although we are not here involved with a disposition of the class
Plaintiffs' fraud claims, it appears from a thorough review of
the foregoing documents and things, including the Bestline Information
Manual which contains guidelines for distributors to respond to
questions asked by prospective distributors, that precious little
information of any substance was provided to the class Plaintiffs
upon which they could determine what efforts, if any, they would
have to contribute to derive their share of the profits from the
operation of Bestline's National Marketing Plan.
The class Plaintiffs necessarily begin their evaluation of the
facts provided in Bestline's standardized presentations upon the
expectation that people from all walks of life, with different
educations, backgrounds and experience, have become successful
in Bestline. This theme was predominant in Bestline's standardized
presentations. This clear expectation rules out any other expectation
that individual class Plaintiffs must bring with them to Bestline
any special or unique experience or ability, but that only a strong
desire to succeed financially and a willingness to work hard toward
that goal would be necessary.
The class Plaintiffs are, however, told that they will receive
valuable training from Bestline. But they are given no details
as to the substance of such training. They must inevitably expect
to completely rely upon any such training to derive their share
of the proceeds from the Bestline National Marketing Plan.
The class Plaintiffs could not reasonably expect that their efforts
would involve predominantly the retail sale of Bestline products,
for that is clearly stated in Bestline's standardized presentations
to be the main job of Local Distributors. They likewise could
not expect to operate a place of business and employ administrative
personnel in connection therewith, or to keep customary business
records, for they are specifically told in Bestline's standardized
presentations that a Bestline Direct Distributor has very low
overhead, consisting only of co-op dues, freight and a garage
or basement to warehouse their Bestline product inventory. Although
prospective distributors are told *754 of 'hard work' and
'great effort' required of them, the substantive representations
contained in Bestline's standardized presentation de-emphasize
the significance of such efforts and stress the training, assistance
and guidance which they will receive from Bestline in becoming
successful distributors, and how they will work together with
Bestline and other distributors to so succeed.
Upon a complete review of the totality of the standardized presentations
of the Bestline Business Opportunity to the class Plaintiffs,
and the representations contained therein, we find that reasonable
minds cannot differ in the expectation compelled thereby that
the overwhelmingly dominant feature of an investment in Bestline's
Direct Distributorships was the recruitment of other participants
in the Bestline National Marketing Plan. Virtually every example
contained in such materials relating to the high incomes that
could be obtained as a Bestline distributor relied upon recruitment
of other participants, whether accomplished through the device
of Opportunity Meetings or at other formal or informal presentations.
In view of these findings, we hold that the fortuity of the class
Plaintiffs' investments collectively is essentially dependent
upon Bestline's expertise. Lacking the business acumen possessed
by Bestline and its Corporate Team, the class Plaintiffs inexorably
rely upon Bestline's guidance for the success of their investment.
'This guidance, like the efficacy of Koscot meetings and guidelines
on recruiting prospects and consummating a sale, is uniformly
extended to all investors. That it may bear more productive fruits
in the case of some (distributors) than it does in cases of others
should not vitiate the essential fact that the success of the
(National Marketing Plan) as a whole and customer investments
individually is contingent upon the sagacious (management of the
National Marketing Plan by Bestline and its Corporate Team)'.
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Continental Commodities
Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the review of the voluminous, complete and ample record
in these proceedings, including interrogatories and answers thereto,
admissions and depositions of parties, this Court concludes that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact bearing on the
question of whether the Bestline Direct Distributorships offered
and sold to the Plaintiff class from August 16, 1966 to August
10, 1973 were investment contracts within the meaning of the Federal
securities laws, and that said distributorships were unregistered
in form and offered, sold and distributed to members of the Plaintiff
class by the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
including the mails, and as a matter of law the class of Plaintiffs
is entitled to an interlocutory adjudication with respect thereto.
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