JOHN A. K. BRADLEY, Justice.

*1 Defendant, the former president of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI") was for many years one of the central players in the operation of a worldwide banking empire which engaged in fraud, the fraudulent effort to take over other banking institutions through the misleading of regulators, and the assistance of other criminal activity, including money laundering for drug cartels.

BCCI was closed by regulators in various countries in 1991, and a number of investigations were undertaken around the world. Included among those were several by the United States government and one by the New York County District Attorney. Naqvi, a prime target of these investigations, was indicted by four separate law enforcement agencies. In the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Naqvi was charged with violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), Conspiracy to Commit Racketeering and Conspiracy to commit various interstate monetary and other violations of 18 USC 1952 and 371. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the defendant was charged with Conspiracy to defraud the United States, particularly the Internal Revenue Service, Misapplication of Bank Funds, False Entry in Bank Records, Paying of Unlawful Gratuity, Receipt of Unlawful Gratuity, Money Laundering and Filing a False Tax Return.

In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the defendant was charged with Conspiracy, Wire Fraud, and Racketeering Conspiracy. The defendant pleaded guilty to this last indictment.

In addition, Naqvi was charged in an indictment in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi with fraudulent dissipation of bank funds through fictitious loans and other conduct.

In New York County, the defendant was charged in three indictments. In indictment 287/92, he was charged with the crime of Scheme to Defraud in the First Degree and three counts of Grand Larceny in the First Degree. In indictment 6994/92, he was charged with Scheme to Defraud in the First Degree, Conspiracy in the Fifth Degree, two counts of Commercial Bribery in the First Degree and Grand Larceny in the First Degree. In indictment 6995/92, he was charged with Enterprise Corruption and three counts of Falsifying Business Records in the First Degree.

The People have moved to dismiss all counts of indictment 6994/92 except for the single Grand Larceny count, which they have moved to have consolidated with indictment 287/92. They have also requested that this court defer a decision on any defense motions relating to indictment 6995/92, conceding that a trial of the consolidated indictments would bar any prosecution of indictment 6995/92 on the grounds of former jeopardy.

The defendant has moved for various forms of relief. The most significant is his claim that prosecution of these indictments is barred because of the District of Columbia prosecution.

Although the defendant was prosecuted in various jurisdictions the only prosecution that raises double jeopardy issues is that in the District of Columbia. (The Tampa indictment was dismissed and the Abu Dhabi prosecution is not a bar to a similar prosecution in New York because the New York double jeopardy statute only bars prosecutions when the earlier offense "is charged by an accusatory instrument filed in a court of this state or of any jurisdiction within the United States" CPL 40.30. Abu Dhabi, of course, is located far from this state and the United States).

*2 The indictment in the District of Columbia charged the defendant with crimes of Conspiracy, Wire Fraud and Racketeering Conspiracy. Specifically, the defendant and others were charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States, in particular its bank regulating agencies, by impeding their regulation and supervision of BCCI and its affiliates, the National Bank of Georgia, the Independence Bank of Encino, the Centrust Savings Bank of Miami and other entities. They were also charged with Wire Fraud in the sale of Centrust securities and Racketeering Conspiracy in that they would enrich themselves by deceiving United States financial institutions and regulators while acquiring influence and control of the National Bank of Georgia and Centrust.

On July 8, 1995, the defendant pleaded guilty to the District of Columbia charges of Conspiracy, Wire Fraud, and Racketeering Conspiracy.

Defendant's federal plea agreement encompassed all of the diverse federal indictments and required the defendant to plead guilty to the three charges contained in the District of Columbia indictment, conspiracy, wire fraud, and racketeering conspiracy. Most significantly, the United States and the defendant stipulated that the United States Sentencing Guidelines (28 USC 994) which became effective in November 1989, would apply to defendant's conduct. The United States and the defendant agreed that if the Court found the agreement to be outside the proper range required by the 1989 sentencing guidelines, defendant could withdraw his plea. Pursuant to the 1989 Sentencing Guidelines, a complex formula was utilized to arrive at a sentence range of 108-135 months, with the possibility of subsequent downward adjustments.

The United States sentencing guidelines were revised in 1990. It is undisputed that if the defendant's conduct as alleged in the federal indictment continued into 1991, these revised guidelines would have been applicable and the defendant's sentence would have been required to have been more severe. The People of the State of New York objected to the federal plea agreement; in that connection they pointed out that the defendant's conduct continued into 1991, making the 1990 guidelines applicable.

In response, the Special Counsel for the United States Department of Justice pointed out to the District of Columbia Court that in the view of the United States there was substantial evidence that the defendant had abandoned or withdrawn from the conspiracy in March 1990, mandating the application of the 1989 guidelines. In particular, Special Counsel pointed out that the defendant had confessed to fraud to the Abu Dhabi authorities in early 1990, and been stripped of his operational and executive authority over BCCI. Special Counsel argued that defendant's confession and actions constituted an abandonment and withdrawal, much more than a mere cessation of activity.

At the proceedings at which the defendant's guilty plea was taken, the Government stated its version of the facts underlying the guilty plea and the government's sentencing recommendation. The facts stated by the government went far beyond the scope of the charges in the District of Columbia indictment. Interestingly enough, the government included in its presentation assertions of facts that exactly match the New York Grand Larceny counts and that relate to events after the date the defendant had supposedly abandoned his criminal activity.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

*3 The Court must first consider whether there is a constitutional bar to the People's effort to try the defendant on the state indictment. Until 1990, federal constitutional double jeopardy analysis was predicated on the so - called Blockburger test, Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1931). Under Blockburger, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. See People v. Bokun, 145 M 2d 860; Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161. While, in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), the Supreme Court had approved a test which barred any successive prosecution where some of the same substantive criminal conduct would need to be proven as part of a subsequent criminal prosecution, in U.S. v. Dixon and Foster, 113 S.Ct 2849 (1993), a majority of the Supreme Court rejected Grady, supra. Five Justices held that the proper inquiry was whether, in analyzing the offenses alleged, some substantial fact or aggravation amounted to an additional element or incident present in the later prosecution but lacking in the earlier, and that the earlier prosecution similarly contained some element lacking in the latter. Thus, the Court essentially decreed a return to the Blockburger test.

The Blockburger test essentially bars the subsequent prosecution of an identical offense. See People v. Bokun, supra.. Neither the grand larceny nor scheme to defraud charges here satisfy the Blockburger requirement, as each involves some different elements from the federal charges. Moreover, it is well settled federal constitutional law that principles of "dual sovereignty" permit successive prosecutions of the same or similar offenses by federal and state courts, in order to preserve the sovereign rights of each governmental entity. See Bartkus v. People of the State of Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).

This does not end the inquiry, however. For New York, by statute, has severely limited the applicability of this doctrine, creating an expanded statutory New York law of former jeopardy. Thus CPL 40.20 provides:

1. A person may not be twice prosecuted for the same offense.

2. A person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon the same act or criminal transaction unless:

(a) The offenses as defined have substantially different elements and the acts establishing one offense are in the main clearly distinguishable from those establishing the other; or

(b) Each of the offenses as defined contains an element which is not an element of the other, and the statutory provisions defining such offenses are designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil; or * * *

(e) Each offense involves death, injury, loss or other consequence to a different victim; or

(f) One of the offenses consists of a violation of a statutory provision of another jurisdiction, which offense has been prosecuted in such other jurisdiction and has there been terminated by a court order expressly founded upon insufficiency of evidence to establish some element of such offense which is not an element of the other offense, defined by the laws of this state; or

*4 (g) The present prosecution is for a consummated result offense as defined in subdivision three of section 20.10, which occurred in this state and the offense was the result of a conspiracy, facilitation or solicitation prosecuted in another state.

(h) One of such offenses is enterprise corruption in violation of section 460.20 of the penal law, racketeering in violation of federal law or any comparable offense pursuant to the law of another state and a separate or subsequent prosecution is not barred by section 40.50 of this article.

Key to the implementation of CPL 40.20 are the definitional sections of CPL 40.10:

1. "Offense." An "offense" is committed whenever any conduct is performed which violates a statutory provision defining an offense; and when the same conduct or criminal transaction violates two or more such statutory provisions each such violation constitutes a separate and distinct offense. The same conduct or criminal transaction also establishes separate and distinct offenses when, though violating only one statutory provision, it results in death, injury, loss or other consequences to two or more victims, and such result is an element of the offense as defined. In such case, as many offenses are committed as there are victims.

2. "Criminal transaction" means conduct which establishes at least one offense, and which is comprised of two or more or a group of acts either (a) so closely related and connected in point of time and circumstance of commission as to constitute a single criminal incident, or (b) so closely related in criminal purpose or objective as to constitute elements or integral parts of a single criminal venture.

Turning first to the grand larceny charges, these charges clearly relate to alleged conduct running through 1991. In order to preserve utilization of the 1989 federal sentencing guidelines, the U.S. made a forceful presentation that in its view, the defendant removed himself from the alleged ongoing criminal conduct in time to avoid utililization of the 1990 guidelines. Indeed, such a view was a sine qua non of the plea arrangement. The People of the State of New York have consistently maintained that criminal acts continued by the defendant into 1991.

Several conclusions flow logically from these facts. The defendant, having reaped the benefits of his plea bargain to the extent his alleged non participation in criminal conduct after 1990 permitted him a lesser sentence, should not equitably be heard to argue that his federal plea encompassed such conduct. Moreover, the inherent finding by the federal court in the District of Columbia that criminal conduct ceased before 1991 does not collaterally estop the People from maintaining the instant grand larceny charges. The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that a party is prevented from relitigating an issue which was decided adversely to it in a proceeding in which such party had a fair opportunity to fully litigate the issue. See Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N. Y. 2d 285. The defense does not seriously suggest that the People had a full opportunity to litigate this issue in federal court. Accordingly, there is no bar to prosecution by collateral estoppel.

*5 Pursuant to CPL 40.20 (1), a person may not be prosecuted twice for the same offense, and pursuant to CPL 40.20 (2) , a person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses under certain enumerated circumstances. Since it is the position of the defendant and the federal prosecuting authorities that defendant was not prosecuted for any 1991 offenses in the federal action, neither of these proscriptions is called into play. Thus these charges are not barred.

Turning to the state count charging Scheme to Defraud, a strict analysis of the written charges in the federal indictment reveals a somewhat different fraud than set forth in the state "Ponzi scheme" indictment. The federal indictments do not charge a fraud upon the depositors in their capacity as depositors, to obtain their deposits. While the defendant points to the expansive admissions made by him at the time his plea was taken, and the federal court's reliance on such admissions in imposing sentence, as reflective of the scope of the federal indictment, the People point out that CPL 40.30 (1), in defining when a person is prosecuted for an offense under CPL 40.20, states that a person is prosecuted when he is charged therewith by an accusatory instrument.

The Court agrees with the People that the relevant point of analysis is not what happens at allocution (except to the extent it merely fleshes out ambiguous portions of the indictment), but rather the charges against him set forth in the indictment Matter of Cantave v. Supreme Court, 193 A.D. 2d 277; People v. Abbamonte, 43 N.Y. 2d 74; People v. Helmsley, 170 A.D. 2d 209; Matter of Mason v. Rothwax, 152 A.D. 2d 272, appl. den. by Mason v. Rothwax, 75 N.Y. 2d 705.

Even focusing on the indictment itself, however, leads to the conclusion that the charge is barred. In assessing the scope of CPL 40.10 (2) (b), it has been held that in assessing whether acts are so closely related in criminal purpose and objective as to constitute elements or integral parts of a single criminal venture, what is required is that the acts for which the state seeks to hold the defendant culpable could have been alleged to support the federal charges. People v. Helmsley, 170 A.D. 2d 209 at 210. " 'Absent the statutory exceptions, no matter the number of statutory offenses technically violated, or the number of jurisdictions involved, an accused is not to suffer repeated prosecution for the same general conduct.' " Helmsley quoting Abbamonte.

As in Helmsley, here the federal scheme could easily have encompassed, in its mail and wire fraud charges, the Ponzi scheme charge lodged by the state. Indeed, the alleged fraudulent acts related to the Ponzi scheme charges are alleged in the federal indictments (e.g., creation of false financial statements, and concealment of fraudulent loans); only the focussed effects of those acts is different. For this reason as well, the first exceptions to CPL 40.20, those found in 40.20 (2) (a) and (b) are not applicable (1) because the acts are not in the main clearly distinguishable between the offenses and (2) the offenses are not designed to target very different kinds of harm or evil.

*6 Finally, while at first blush, the charges may appear to involve loss to "different" victims, CPL 40.20 (2) (e), in fact they do not. In Matter of Kaplan v. Ritter, 71 N. Y. 2d 222, the Court of Appeals held that this exception applies "only when all of the offenses included in a prior prosecution involved specific, individually identifiable victims and the second prosecution arising from the same transaction involves other individual victims." Id at 230. Here, no individual victims are identified in the state indictment.

AS to Enterprise Corruption, since it is uncertain whether the People will press this issue to trial, and has not briefed that portion of the motion, the Court will defer ruling.

INSPECTION AND DISCOVERY

The defendant has requested the court review the Grand Jury minutes to determine whether the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally sufficient to support each and every count of the indictment and to ensure that the proceedings were properly conducted. He also asks for the release of the Grand Jury minutes. The Court has previously reviewed the 9500 pages of testimony and legal instructions and found them to be legally sufficient and that the proceedings were properly conducted in conformity with the law. After re- reviewing certain portions of the Grand Jury minutes that relate specifically to this defendant the Court adheres to its original decision and finds the minutes to be sufficient as to this defendant.

The People have not yet responded to the defendant's bill of particulars. The People are directed to respond to the bills of particulars.

CONCLUSION

The People's motion to consolidate the twelve count indictment 6994/92 with indictment 287/92 and to dismiss the remaining counts of 6994/92 as against this defendant is granted.

The defendant's motion to dismiss the consolidated indictment, 287/92, is granted to the extent of dismissing the first count, Scheme to Defraud in the First Degree, and otherwise denied.

The defendant's motion for discovery and a bill of particulars is granted. The defendant's motion for release of the Grand Jury minutes is denied.